Posts

US Pipeline Incidents map

Pipeline Incidents Updated and Analyzed

Pipeline spill in Mayflower, AR on March 29, 2013. Photo by US EPA via Wikipedia.

The debate over the Keystone XL pipeline expansion project has grabbed a lot of headlines, but it is just one of several proposed major pipeline projects in the United States. As much of the discussion revolves around potential impacts of the pipeline system, a review of known incidents is relevant to the discussion.

A year ago, the FracTracker Alliance calculated that there was an average of 1.6 pipeline incidents per day in the United Sates.  That figure remains accurate, with 2,452 recorded incidents between January 1, 2010 and March 3, 2014, a span of 1,522 days.

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) classifies the incidents into three categories:

  • Gas transmission and gathering:  Gathering lines take natural gas from the wells to midstream infrastructure.  Transmission lines transport natural gas from the regions in which it is produced to other locations, often thousands of miles away.  Since 2010, there have been 486 incidents on these types of lines, resulting in 10 fatalities, 71 injuries, and $620 million in property damage.
  • Oil and hazardous liquid:  This includes all materials overseen by PHMSA other than natural gas, predominantly crude and refined petroleum products.  Liquified natural gas is included in this category.  There were 1,511 incidents during the reporting period for these pipelines, causing 6 deaths and 15 injuries, and $1.8 billion in property damage.
  • Gas distribution:  These pipelines are used by utilities to get natural gas to consumers.  In just over 40 months, there were 455 incidents, resulting in 42 people getting killed, 183 reported injuries, and $86 million in property damage.

Curiously, while incidents on distribution lines accounted for 72 percent of fatalities and 67 percent of all injuries, the property damage in these cases were only responsible for just over 3 percent of $2.5 billion in total property damage from pipeline spills since 2010.  A reasonable hypothesis accounting for the deaths and injuries is that distribution lines are much more common in densely populated areas than are the other types of pipelines; an incident that might be fatal in an urban area might go unnoticed for days in more remote locations, for example.  However, as the built environment is also much more densely located in urban areas, it does seem surprising that reported property damage isn’t closer to being in line with physical impacts on humans.

How accurate are the data?

In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, governmental agency data suddenly became much more opaque.  In terms of pipelines, public access to the pipeline data that had been mapped to that point was removed.  It was later restored, with limitations.  As it stands now, most pipeline data in the United States, including the link to the pipeline proposal map above, are intentionally generalized to the point where pipelines might not even be rendered in the appropriate township, let alone street.

There are some exceptions, though.  If you would like to know where pipelines are in US waters in the Gulf of Mexcio, for example, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management makes that data not only accessible to view, but available for download on data.gov, a site dedicated to data transparency.  While the PHMSA will not do the same with terrestrial pipelines, the do release location data along with their incident data.


Pipeline incidents from 1/1/2010 through 3/3/2014. To access details, legend, and other map controls, please click the expanding arrows icon in the top-right corner of the map.

This fatal pipeline incident was in Allentown, PA, but was given coordinates in Greenland.

This fatal pipeline incident was in Allentown, PA, but was given coordinates in Greenland.

Unfortunately, we see evidence that the data are not well vetted, at least in terms of location.  One of the most serious incidents in the timeframe, an explosion in Allentown, Pennsylvania that killed five people and injured three more, was given coordinates that render in the middle of Greenland.  Another incident leading to fatalities was given location data that put it in Manatoba, well outside of the reach of the US agency that publishes the data.  Still another incident appears to be in the Pacific Ocean, 1,300 miles west-southwest of Mexico.  There are many more examples as well, but the majority of incidents seem to be reasonably well located.

Fuzzy data: are national security concerns justified?

Anyone who watches the news on a regular basis knows that there are people out there who mean others harm. However, a closer look at the incident data shows that pipelines are not a common means of accomplishing such an end.

Causes of pipeline incidents from 1/1/10 to 3/3/14, with counts.

Causes of pipeline incidents from 1/1/10 to 3/3/14, with counts.

For each category showing causation, there are numerous subcategories. While we don’t need to look into all of those here, it is worth pointing out that there is a subcategory of, “other outside force damage” that is designated as, “intentional damage.”  Of the 2,452 total incidents, nine incidents fall into this subcategory.  These subcategories are further broken down, and while there is an option to express that the incident is a result of terrorism, none have been designated that way in this dataset .  Five of the nine incidents are listed as acts of vandalism, however. To be thorough, and because it provides a fascinating insight into work in the field, let’s take a look at the narrative description for each incident that are labeled as intentional in origin:

  • Approximately 2 bbls of crude oil were released when an unknown person(s) removed the threaded pressure warning device on the scraper trap’s closure door. As a result of the absence of the 1/2 inch pressure warning device crude oil was able to flow from the open port upon start up of the pipeline and pressurization of the scraper trap. Once this was discovered the 1/2 inch pressure warning device was properly put back into the scaper trap.
  • Aboveground piping intentionally shot by unknown party. Installed stoppall on line at 176+73 (7 146′) upstream of damaged aboveground piping. Cut and capped pipeline.
  • Friday october 18th at approximately 6:00 p.m. we were notified of a gas line break at Kayenta Mobile Home Park. The Navajo Police responded to an emergency call about vandals in one of the parks alley ways kicking at meters. Upon arrival they found the broke meter riser at the mobile home park and expediently used the emergency shutdown system to remedy the situation. This immediately cut service to 118 customers in the park. [Names removed] responded to the call. we arrived on site at approximately 9:30 p.m. We located the damage and fixed the system at approximately 1:30 a.m. i called the Amerigas emergency call center and informed them that we would be restarting the system the following morning and to tell our customers they would need to be home in order to restore service. We then started the procedure of shutting every valve off to all customers before restarting the system. We started the system back up at 9:30a.m. 10/19/2013. Once the system was up to full pressure and all systems were normal we began putting customers back into service. The completion of re-establishing service to all customers on the system was completed on 10/23/2013.
  • A service tech was called at 1:15 am Sunday morning to respond to the Marlboro Fire Department at an apparent explosion and house fire. The tech arrived and called for additional resources. He then began to check for migrating gas in the surrounding buildings along the service to the house and in the street. no gas readings were detected. The distribution and service on call personnel arrived and began calling in additional company resources to assist in the response effort and controlling the incident. A distribution crew was called in to shut off and cut the service. Additional service techs were called in to assist in checking the surrounding buildings and in the streets at catch basins and manholes around the entire block. Gas supply personnel were called in and dispatched to take odorant samples in the houses directly across from 15 Grant Ct. that had active gas service. Gas survey crews were called in to survey Grant St. and the two parallel streets McEnelly St. and Washington Ct. along with the portion of Washington st. in between these streets. The meter and meter bar assembly were taken by the investigators as evidence. The service was pressure tested to the riser which was witnessed by a representative of the DPI. The service was cut off at the main. After the investigators completed gathering evidence at the scene they gave permission to begin cleaning up the site. There was a tenant home at the time of the explosion who was conscious and walking around when the fire department arrived. He was taken to the hospital and reports are that he sustained 2nd and 3rd degree burns on portions of his body.
  • On Friday, September 7, 2012 PSE&G responded to a gas emergency call involving a gas ignition. The initial call came in from the Orange Fire Department at 17:09 as a house fire at 272 Reock Ave Orange; the fire chief stated gas was not involved and the fire was caused by squatters. Subsequent investigation of the incident revealed that the fire was caused when one of the squatters lit a match which ignited leaking gas originating from gas piping removed from the head of an inside meter set. The gas meter inlet valve and associated piping were all removed by an unknown person on an unknown date prior to the fire. An appliance service tech responded and shut the gas off at the curb at 17:40 on September 7 2012. A street crew was dispatched and the gas service to 272 reock ave was cut at the curb at 19:00. Two people (names unknown) squatters were injured one by the fire one was injured jumping out a window to escape the fire. The home in question was vacated by the owner and the injured parties were trespassing on the property at the time of the incident. PSE&G has been unable to confirm any information on the status of their injuries due to patient confidentiality laws.
  • The homeowner tampered with company piping by removing 3/4″ steel end cap with a 3/4″ steel nipple on the tee was removed which caused the gas leak in the basement and resulted in a flash fire. The most likely source of ignition was the water heater. The homeowner died in the incident.
  • A structure fire involved an unoccupied hardware store and a small commercial 12-meter manifold. There were no meters on the manifold and no customers lost service. The heat from the structure fire melted a regulator on the manifold which in turn released gas and contributed to the fire. The cause is officially undetermined; however according to the fire department the cause appears to be arson with the fire starting in the back of the building and not from PG&E facilities. PG&E was notified of this incident by the fire department at 1802 hours. The gas service representative arrived on scene at 1830 hours. The fire department stopped the flow of gas by closing the service valve and the fire was extinguished at approximately 1900 hours. this incident was determined to be reportable due to damages to the building exceeding $50,000. There were no fatalities and no injuries as a result of this incident. Local news media was on-site but no major media was present.
  • A house explosion and fire occurred at approximately 0208 hours on 2/7/10. The fire department called at PG&E at 0213 hours. PG&E personnel arrived at 0245 hours. The fire department had shut off the service valve and removed the meter before PG&E arrived. The house was unoccupied at the time of the explosion. The gas service account was active and the gas service was on (contrary to initial report). The cause of the explosion is undetermined at the time of this report but the fire department has indicated the cause appears to be arson. After the explosion, PG&E performed a leak survey of the service the services on both sides of this address and the gas main in the front of all three of these addresses. No indication of gas was found. PG&E also performed bar hole tests over the service at 3944 17th Avenue and found no indication of gas. The gas service was cut off at the main and will be re-connected when the customer is ready for service.
  • On Monday, January 25, 2010 at approximately 2:30pm a single-family home at 2022 west 63rd Street Cleveland OH (Cuyahoga County) was involved in an explosion/fire. The gas service line was shut-off at approximately 4:30pm. A leak survey of the main lines and service lines on W. 83rd between Madison and Lorain revealed no indications of gas near the structure. A service leak at 2131 West 83rd Street was detected during the leak survey. This service line was replaced upon discovery. On Tuesday, January 26th, 2010 the service line at 2022 W. 83rd was air tested at operating pressure with no pressure loss. An odor test was conducted at 2028 West 83rd Street. The results of this odor test revealed odor levels well within dot compliance levels. Our investigation revealed an odor complaint at this residence on January 18th. Dominion personnel responded to the call and met with the Cleveland Fire Department. Dominion found the meter disconnected and the meter shut-off valve in the half open position. The shut-off valve was closed by the Dominion technician and secured with a locking device. The technician placed a 3/4 inch plug in the open end of the valve. The technician also attempted to close the curb-slop valve but could not. The service line was then bar hole tested utilizing a combustible gas indicator from the street to the structure. As a result, no leakage was discovered. A second attempt to close the curb box valve on January 19th ended when blockage was discovered in the valve box. The valve box was in the process of being scheduled for excevatlon and shut off by a construction crew at the time of the incident. An investigation of the incident site determined the cause to be arson as approximately 6 inches of service line and the meter shut-off valve (with locking device still intact) detached from the service line were recovered inside the structure.

While several of these narratives do make it seem as if the incidents in question were deliberate, these seem to have been caused by people on the ground, not by some GIS-powered remote effort. Seven of the nine incidents were on distribution lines, which tend to occur in populated areas, where contact with gas infrastructure is in fact commonplace, and six out of those seven incidents occurred inside houses or other structures.

On the other hand, there is a real danger in not knowing where pipelines are located. 237 accidents were due to excavation activities, and 86 others were caused by boats, cars, or other vehicles unrelated to excavation activity. Better knowledge of the location of these pipelines could reduce these numbers significantly.

North American Pipeline Proposal Map

By Ted Auch, PhD – OH Program Coordinator, FracTracker Alliance

With all the focus on the existing TransCanada Keystone XL pipeline – as well as the primary expansion proposal recently rejected by Lancaster County, NB Judge Stephanie Stacy and more recently the Canadian National Energy Board’s approval of Enbridge’s Line 9 pipeline – we thought it would be good to generate a map that displays related proposals in the US and Canada.

North American Proposed Pipelines and Current Pipelines


To view the fullscreen version of this map along with a legend and more details, click on the arrows in the upper right hand corner of the map.

The map was last updated in October 2014.

Pipeline Incidents

The frequency and intensity of proposals and/or expansions of existing pipelines has increased in recent years to accompany the expansion of the shale gas boom in the Great Plains, Midwest, and the Athabasca Tar Sands in Alberta. This expansion of existing pipeline infrastructure and increased transport volume pressures has resulted in significant leakages in places like Marshall, MI along the Kalamazoo River and Mayflower, AR. Additionally, the demand for pipelines is rapidly outstripping supply – as can be seen from recent political pressure and headline-grabbing rail explosions in Lac-Mégantic, QC, Casselton, ND, Demopolis, AL, and Philadelphia.1 According to rail transport consultant Anthony Hatch, “Quebec shocked the industry…the consequences of any accident are rising.” This sentiment is ubiquitous in the US and north of the border, especially in Quebec where the sites, sounds, and casualties of Lac-Mégantic will not soon be forgotten.

Improving Safety Through Transparency

It is imperative that we begin to make pipeline data available to all manner of parties ex ante for planning purposes. The only source of pipeline data historically has been the EIA’s Pipeline Network. However, the last significant update to this data was 7/28/2011 – meaning much of the recent activity has been undocumented and/or mapped in any meaningful way. The EIA (and others) claims national security is a primary reason for the lack of data updates, but it could be argued that citizens’ right-to-know with respect to pending proposals outweighs such concerns – at least at the county or community level. There is no doubt that pipelines are magnets for attention, stretching from the nefarious to the curious. Our interest lies in filling a crucial and much requested data gap.

Metadata

Pipelines in the map above range from the larger Keystone and Bluegrass across PA, OH, and KY to smaller ones like the Rex Energy Seneca Extension in Southeast Ohio or the Addison Natural Gas Project in Vermont. In total the pipeline proposals presented herein are equivalent to 46% of EIA’s 34,133 pipeline segment inventory (Table 1).

Table 1. Pipeline segments (#), min/max length, total length, and mean length (miles).

Section

#

Min

Max

Mean

Sum

Bakken

34

18

560

140

4,774

MW East-West

68

5

1,056

300

20,398

Midwest to OK/TX

13

13

1,346

307

3,997

Great Lakes

5

32

1,515

707

3,535

TransCanada

3

612

2,626

1,341

4,021

Liquids Ventures

2

433

590

512

1,023

Alliance et al

3

439

584

527

1,580

Rocky Express

2

247

2,124

1,186

2,371

Overland Pass

6

66

1,685

639

3,839

TX Eastern

15

53

1,755

397

5,958

Keystone Laterals

4

32

917

505

2,020

Gulf Stream

2

541

621

581

1,162

Arbuckle ECHO

25

27

668

217

5,427

Sterling

9

42

793

313

2,817

West TX Gateway

13

1

759

142

1,852

SXL in PA and NY

15

48

461

191

2,864

New England

70

2

855

65

4,581

Spectra BC

9

11

699

302

2,714

Alliance et al

4

69

4,358

2,186

4,358

MarkWest

63

2

113

19

1,196

Mackenzie

46

3

2,551

190

8,745

Total

411

128

1,268

512

89,232

This is equivalent to 46% of the current hydrocarbon pipeline inventory in the US across the EIA’s inventory of 34,133 pipeline segments with a total length of 195,990 miles

The map depicts all of the following (Note: Updated quarterly or when notified of proposals by concerned citizens):

  1. All known North American pipeline proposals
  2. Those pipelines that have yet to be documented by the EIA’s Natural Gas Pipeline Network mapping team
  3. EIA documented pipelines more accurately mapped to the county level (i.e., select northeastern pipelines)
  4. The current Keystone XL pipeline and the Keystone XL expansion proposal rectified to the county level in Nebraska, South Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas

We generated this map by importing JPEGs into ArcMAP 10.2, we then “Fit To Display”. Once this was accomplished we anchored the image (i.e., georeferenced) in place using a minimum of 10 control points (Note: All Root Mean Square (RMS) error reports are available upon request) and as many as 30-40. When JPEGs were overly distorted we then converted or sought out Portable Network Graphic (PNG) imagery to facilitate more accurate anchoring of imagery.

We will be updating this map periodically, and it should be noted that all layers are a priori aggregations of regional pipelines across the 4 categories above.

Imagery sources:

  1. Northeast – Long Island Sound, Montreal to Portland, Westchester, Spectra Energy Northeast, Maritime Northeast-Algonquin-Texas Eastern, Delaware River Watershed, Northeastern accuracy of existing EIA data, New England Kinder Morgan, Spectra Energy-Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP)-Portland Natural Gas Transmission System (PNGTS)
  2. Duluth to The Dakotas, NYMarc Pipeline, Mariner East, Millenium Pipeline Company, WBI Energy’s Bakken,
  3. British Columbia – Enbridge, Spectra/BG, Coastal, Tanker Route
  4. Midwest – ATEX and Bluegrass, BlueGrass, BlueGrass Pipeline,
  5. TransCanada/New England – Portland, Financial Post,
  6. Alaska Pipelines Historically
  7. Rail projects and primary transport
  8. Keystone Tar Sands – Canada (website no longer active), United States, Texas-Oklahoma
  9. Gulf Coast – Florida
  10. MarkWest Houston, Liberty, Liberty, Houston and Majorsville,
  11. Texas Oklahoma – Granite Wash Extension,
  12. Ohio – Spectra Energy, Enterprise Products, Kinder Morgan, Buckeye-Kinder Morgan-El Paso, Chesapeake Energy and AEP
  13. The Rockies Express Pipeline (REX)

Reference

1. Krauss, C, & Mouawad, J. (2014, January 25). Accidents Surge as Oil Industry Takes the Train, The New York Times.

 

Portage County, OH Mountaineer Keystone Proposal

Ohio has seen its share of unconventional natural gas extraction in recent years. Now, the state is facing an influx of pipeline infrastructure to manage and distribute the extracted gas. In Portage County, OH, Mountaineer Keystone is of particular interest. FracTracker Alliance and Concerned Citizens Ohio have worked together to better understand the nature and extent of this activity.

Proposal Details

By Gwen Fischer and Trish Harness, Concerned Citizens Ohio, Portage County; Map by Ted Auch

Mt. Keystone will not invest in pipeline easements unless they believe their Return On Investment (ROI) will be great, so we expect them to drill intensively in the areas with many parcels leased and to link those parcels with pipelines wherever they have easements. They may also be seeking new pipeline easements.

Leases and easements are legal documents, and the details (how deep, placement, etc.) are critical to understanding what the industry is allowed to do on the land. Drilling companies don’t always go door to door to get a new lease. Door-to-door “landsmen” need only approach previously unleased properties. If the old lease was open-ended, a drilling company may be able to obtain a permit to drill a deeper well without negotiating new terms. If the lease was restrictive, the drilling company may need to negotiate to put a deep shale well pad or other “surface disturbance” changes not specified earlier. Without examining each lease individually, the map below cannot tell us what exactly is permitted, or where on the property. In addition, landowners should know that (depending on the terms of the lease) leases can be purchased without the owner’s knowledge. Thus, the owner may think they know the drilling company or the oil/gas production company they are dealing with, when in fact the ownership of the drilling or production well has changed.

Another item that the public should be aware of is that obtaining leases for mineral rights does not automatically grant rights for pipeline easements, but the leases could be written so as to allow for both drilling and pipelines.

The easements with Mt. Keystone are for water and waste flowback – but (given some pipeline easements we’ve seen with other companies) it is possible the pipelines could (will) be “re-purposed” for production from shale wells on the leased lands, once the wells are drilled. Even more open-ended options are possible.

About the Map

This map shows land parcels with publicly recorded mineral rights leases (for drilling) and Right of Way (ROW) easements for pipelines registered under Mountaineer Keystone’s name. No other company that might hold easements or leases is included. The map was created using public records, available on the Portage County Recorder’s and the Portage County Auditor’s websites. We utilized the raw and updated Portage County parcel shapefile and identified parcels using dummy variables with -1 identifying Mt. Keystone’s leases (825 parcels, 6,455 total acres, average 8 acres), 1 representing Mt. Keystone Right of Ways (ROWs) for pipelines (132 parcels, 2,837 total acres, average 22 acres), and 0 representing neither. Additionally, 14 of these parcels fall under those that have leases and ROWs (353 acres, average 25 acres)**.

Click on the arrows in the upper right hand corner of the map for the legend and to view the map fullscreen.

Well information comes from ODNR (Ohio Department of Natural Resources) data on their website . All of Portage county was checked for leases or easements, and this represents all of the townships and about half of the actual leases.
New mineral rights leases are parcels where a high volume, horizontal shale (HVHS) production well may be drilled, or the horizontal “laterals”may be drilled under the land. The three existing HVHS wells and their laterals are shown. ROW easements are for pipelines. A few parcels have both easements and leased mineral rights. Since permits for future wells have not yet been applied for, we cannot know exactly where on any parcel a well pad or the laterals will be drilled. Properties with leases for wells already drilled are included. Without examining individual easements, we cannot know exactly where on a parcel pipelines will be laid.

** Recently we added 103 parcels from Geauga County parcels that Mountaineer Keystone purchased from Excalibur Oil within the proposed ROW. These parcels total 1,843 acres with a range of 0.45 to 117 acres and a mean of 18 acres to date.

Controversial Pinelands Pipeline Defeated

For many months, a battle has been raging in New Jersey about whether to convert the coal-burning BL England power plant to natural gas. While coal-burning is relatively more polluting (especially in terms of sulfur dioxide, NOx, and carbon dioxide emissions) and more expensive than natural gas, natural gas power plants bring with them other concerns. In order to repower this plant on the shore of Cape May County, a 22-mile-long pipeline was proposed to be built through the 1.1-million acre New Jersey Pinelands National Reserve, a sensitive wetland habitat that straddles the Cape May and Cumberland County lines. The pipeline would have run adjacent to Rt 49, a main highway that bisects the Pinelands. Although the administration of Governor Chris Christie had lobbied strongly for the project, saying that the pipeline would go under and alongside existing roads, opponents of the project felt that that it posed too much of a threat to state- and federally-regulated wetlands and other Natural Heritage sites.


Map of Proposed Pinelands Pipeline plan (defeated). For a full-screen version of this map (including map legend), click here.

On Friday, January 10, the New Jersey Pinelands Commission rejected the proposal by New Jersey Gas to move ahead with the project. According to the New York Times, New Jersey Gas would have been exempt from a ban on additional transmission pipelines through the Pinelands because they were including an offer to acquire and preserve two to three thousand acres of land near the pipeline route. Now, the next decision will be whether to find an alternate route for gas delivery to the plant if it is converted, keep the plant running on coal, or, perhaps, like has been suggested for other sites like the Cayuga and Dunkirk plants in New York State, choose to upgrade the efficiency of transmission lines, and capture energy that is currently lost.

For more information:
New Jersey Pinelands National Reserve National Park Service website
New Jersey Officials Back Pinelands Pipeline NY Post, 12/12/2013
Panel Blocks Gas Pipeline in New Jersey Pinelands New York Times, 1/11/2014
Controversial Repowering of the Cayuga and Dunkirk Coal-fired Power Plants, Earthjustice website
Coal-To-Natural-Gas Switch For Power Generation Is Paying Off In Smaller Carbon Footprint, International Business Times, 1/14/2014

Data sources
National Wetlands Inventory: US Fish and Wildlife Service

Well and pipeline data in British Columbia

British Columbia Map Now Available

Increasingly, FracTracker has been receiving requests to map oil and gas data from a variety of locations.  Now for the first time since the roll-out of the ArcGIS Online-based FracMapper platform last year, we have content dedicated to understanding oil and gas data outside of the United States.  Specifically, this map is focused on the extractive – and midstream – activities in British Columbia, Canada.


British Columbia Shale Viewer. Please click the expanding arrows icon in the upper right corner of the map to access the full page map, complete with legend and descriptions.

British Columbia’s Oil and Gas Commission has records for over 29,000 wells, of which over 11,000 are indicated as being directional.  These are the wells included on this map.  While directional drilling is a broader category than horizontal drilling, which is more commonly associated with hydraulic fracturing, it was the most readily available means of finding wells likely to be unconventional in nature.  And indeed, a substantial majority of the directional wells drilled in the province correspond to the unconventional plays in the northeastern portion of British Columbia.

While the available well data was lacking some of the detail that FracTracker prefers, this is made up for by a data type that is difficult to encounter in the United States:  pipeline rights-of-way.  Note that not all of the wells on the map are connected by pipelines.  One explanation is that the pipeline data are from October 30, 2006 onward, while over 3,600 of the directional wells were drilled before that time.

Well and pipeline data in British Columbia
This image shows a closeup of the British Columbia Shale Viewer, highlighting pipeline data

Other notable data types for British Columbia include oil and gas facilities, and a layer showing the extent of individual well sites.  For more information, see the Details section of the map.

US Pipelines Incidents Are a Daily Occurrence

Recently, there has been a lot of attention focused on the Mayflower, Arkansas pipeline failure that resulted in a massive oil spill, particularly as it comes at a time when discussions of the controversial Keystone XL Pipeline project are once again heating up.  However, the situation is far from unusual.  In fact, according to data downloaded from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), there were 1,887 incidents in the nation’s gathering and transmission, distribution, and hazardous liquids pipelines between January 1, 2010 and March 29, 2013, or an average of 1.6 incidents per day.

Pipeline incidents from 1/1/2010 through 3/29/2013.

Pipeline incidents from 1/1/2010 through 3/29/2013. Data Source: PHMSA.

Obviously, not all of these failures are on par with the massive spill in Mayflower, and it should be noted that there are a variety of reasons for these lines to fail.  Some of these reasons, such as excavation activity in the vicinity of a pipeline, are not necessarily the fault of the pipeline’s operator.  The fact that these incidents are commonplace, however, is not one that can be dismissed.


Pipeline incidents in the United States from 1/1/2010 through 3/29/2013. Source: PHMSA.  Red Triangles represent incidents leading to fatalities, and yellow triangles represent those leading to injuries.  To access the legend and other controls, click the “Fullscreen” icon at the top-right corner of the map.

It is clear from the map that there a few data entry errors, as a few of the data points draw in locations that aren’t even in the jurisdiction of the United States. However, each entry also contains a city and state that the incident is associated with, and for the most part, the data seem to be fairly reliable.